203.432.9926

William C. Brainard Professor of Economics & Professor of Management

Professor Polak is an expert on decision theory, game theory, and economic history. His work explores economic agents whose goals are richer than those captured in traditional models. His work on game theory ranges from foundational theoretical work on common knowledge, to applied topics in corporate finance and law and economics. Most recently, he has made contributions to the theory of repeated games with asymmetric information. Other research interests include economic inequality and individuals' responses to uncertainty. Professor Polak is currently engaged in an ambitious empirical project that tackles questions of industrial organization in the setting of industrial revolution in England.

Achievements and Awards
The Lex Hixon '63 Prize for Teaching Excellence in the Social Sciences, Yale College, 2006
Graduate Teaching Prize, Economics Department, Yale, 2005
William Clyde DeVane Medal for undergraduate teaching and scholarship at Yale College, 2005
Graduate Advising Prize, Economics Department, Yale, 2004
Henry Kohn Associate Professor Chair, 1999-2001
Alfred P. Sloan Research Fellowship, 1998
Junior Fellow, Harvard University Society of Fellows, 1991-1994
Harvard GSAS Merit Fellow, 1990-1991
Harvard Economics "Goldsmith" essay prize, 1990
Cambridge University Wrenbury Prize for Economics, 1984
Trinity College Van Heyden de Lancey Prize, 1984

Editorships
Associate Editor, Journal of Economic Theory

Selected Articles
"'Bayesian Beliefs with Stochastic Monotonicity’: An Extension of Machnina & Schmeidler" (with S. Grant), Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 130 No. 1, 264-282, 2006 

"The Emergence and Persistence of the Anglo-Saxon and German Financial Systems" (with S. Baliga), Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 17, No. 1, 129-163, 2004

"A Model of a Predatory State" (with B. Moselle), Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 17, 1-33, 2001

"Regulating Consumer Bankruptcy: A Theoretical Inquiry" (with B. Adler and A. Schwartz), Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 29, 585-613, 2001

"Temporal Resolution of Uncertainty and Non-Expected Utility Models" (with S. Grant and A. Kajii), Econometrica, Vol. 68, 425-434, 2000

"Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium, and Common Knowledge of Rationality" Econometrica, Vol. 67, 673-676, 1998

"When Managers Cover Their Posteriors: Making the Decisions the Market Wants to See" (with A. Brandenburger), Rand Journal of Economics, 523-541, 1996

Working Papers
"Epistemic Conditions for Bayesian Equilibrium, and Common Knowledge Rationality"

Education
PhD Harvard University, 1992
MA Northwestern University, 1985
BA Cambridge University, 1984